We study the relationship between the political connections of Chinese rms and workplace fatalities. The worker death rate for connected companies is ve times that of unconnected rms; this result also holds when we exploit executive turnover to generate within-rm estimates. The connections-mortality relationship is attenuated in provinces where ocials' promotion is contingent on meeting safety quotas. Fatal accidents produce negative returns at connected companies and are associated with the subsequent departure of well-connected executives. Our ndings emphasize the social costs of political connections. 
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There exists a longstanding debate on the social impact of corruption. The eects hinge to some degree on whether political ties allow businesses to circumvent onerous bureaucratic constraints or force them to comply with regulations that are socially benecial but result in lower rm prots. Yet there is little empirical evidence on the costs and benets of corruption. In this paper, we examine the role of corruption in workplace fatalities in China, thus highlighting the cost side of this tradeo.
There have been many journalistic accounts of substandard working conditions in Chinese industries ranging from electronics component production (as with the recent exposé of Apple's supplier Foxconn) to the coal industry, which is responsible for thousands of mining deaths each year. In 2003, the worker mortality rate per ton of coal extracted in Chinese mines was 100 times higher than that of American mines and thirty times higher than that of South African mines, which plausibly have similar labor conditions. 1 Media reports suggest that corruption -i.e., business-government ties for the benet of corporate prots, contribute to the high mortality rate of Chinese coal miners. In 2005, the national minister of production safety, Li Yizhong, directly attributed the sector's poor safety record to corruption, saying, Corruption is one major reason why accidents happen again and again. . . It is high time that we took a careful look at connections between local coal mine owners, local ocials and the safety watchdog. These links have set up barriers against strict safety supervision.
Others
have taken the contrary view -politicians plausibly put more weight on worker welfare relative to prots than businessmen, so that political ties could lead to higher worker safety at politically connected rms.
In this paper, we present three sets of empirical results that help to shed light on the link between political connections and workplace safety. First, we document a positive relationship between political connections and worker mortality; second, we study how this relationship is aected by performance incentives for safety regulators; nally, we examine the implications of worker deaths for expected rm prots and in particular, how the impact on a rm's share price depends on its political ties.
We begin by showing a robust positive correlation between the political ties of executives and worker fatalities at publicly traded Chinese companies. We dene a company to be politically connected if its CEO or another C-suite executive previously held a high-level government post, and we nd that the rate of workplace deaths at connected rms is ve times higher than at unconnected rms (1 versus 5 deaths per 1,000 workers annually) from 2008 to 2011. This pattern holds in regression specications, both in the cross-section and also in a rm-year panel with xed eects, where the connection-fatality relationship is identied from within-rm executive turnover (the results are also robust to estimation using propensity score 1 Coal mining: Most deadly job in China, China Daily, November 13, 2004. 2 Coal miners pay with their lives for cronyism in China, Hindustan Times, August 11, 2005. 2 matching). We consider several alternative hypotheses that could account for this patternsuch as dierential rates of misreporting for connected versus unconnected rms or dierences in management talent -and also whether the selection of connected executives could bias our results. While our results are not dispositive, we argue that our full set of results are best explained by the use of political relationships to circumvent safety oversight and regulation and that selection concerns are unlikely to be a dominant factor in explaining our ndings.
We then go on to explore the eect of regulatory incentives on worker deaths. We nd that worker mortality is lower in provinces where ocials' promotion is contingent on meeting safety quotas. More importantly, we nd that this eect is exclusively the result of lower mortality rates for connected companies, suggesting that government ocials will be less prone to ignoring regulatory violations at well-connected rms when high-powered safety incentives are imposed on regulators.
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Finally, we analyze the implications of worker deaths for rm share prices, and how this relationship diers as a function of political connections. This is of particular interest as investor responses to worker deaths can help to adjudicate among potential mechanisms through which political ties aect worker safety. We perform an event study analysis of the 239 accidents where we are able to determine the precise accident date. While we nd no signicant impact of workplace fatalities on share price in the overall sample, event returns are negative for politically connected rms. Our analysis -while noisily estimated -suggests cumulative abnormal returns of -4.7 percent for connected rms relative to unconnected ones in the week following an accident, with the eect doubling to -9.7 percent over a 30 day trading window. 4 Investors' expectations are validated by subsequent changes in operating prots: in the year following an accident, return on assets is lower for well-connected rms, and largely unchanged for the rest of the sample. Further, a fatal accident predicts the departure of political connected executives by the end of the calendar year that the accident occurred, indicating that the expected loss of political connections -and their accompanying benets -play a role in the negative market reaction.
Our work contributes most directly to the literature on the consequences of government regulation. Many of the empirical contributions in this area have emphasized the negative impact of onerous regulations on economic growth (see, for example, Djankov et al (2002) on entry regulation, and Bourlès et al (2010) for product market regulation). An exception is Bertrand et al (2007) , which nds that driver's license applicants in India obtain their licenses more quickly when given a nancial incentive to do so (and hence are likely to get 3 We note that the shortness of our panel -and its lack of overlap with most province-level changes in regulation -implies that these results are identied from cross-sectional dierences in regulation across provinces and hence should be interpreted with some caution. 4 The slow market response is due to the fact that worker deaths are generally not announced to the public immediately after they occur.
licenses through bribery). Furthermore, drivers that likely obtained licenses through bribery subsequently performed poorly on driving tests. By focusing on worker deaths, we look more directly at the welfare consequences of regulation; further, we focus on high-level connections rather than petty corruption.
More broadly, our study contributes to the literature on the social costs and benets of corruption. The theoretical foundations of this eld were laid by Le (1964) , Becker and Stigler (1974) , and Shleifer and Vishny (1993), which consider the circumstances where bribery and corruption will be most costly (Olken and Pande (2012) provide a recent survey).
Mauro's (1995) cross-country analysis of corruption and growth was the rst of many studies over the past couple of decades to explore the correlates of corruption empirically (see Fisman and Svensson (2007) and Bai et al (2013) for within-country analyses). This literature has often used the political connections of businesses -the measure we employ in this paper -as a marker for favorable treatment by government ocials.
5 While prior research has established the implications of political ties for rm prots, our study illustrates the social costs.
Finally, our paper relates to the concurrent work of Jia and Nie (2013), who investigate the impact of government decentralization on worker deaths in Chinese coal mines. We view our study as complementary to theirs: whereas Jia and Nie focus on shifts in political structure and the resultant eect on collusion between state-owned enterprises and local governments, we study the rm-level impact of political connections of private businesses (indeed, we nd that our results are unaected by controlling for state ownership of the enterprises in our sample, highlighting the fact that the two papers focus on independent channels). We also emphasize that our work exploits rm-level data, and examines a wider array of industries.
Our work also contributes to the related eld that examines the propensity of companies to act in a socially responsible manner and the nancial implications of doing so. The rest of this paper is organized as following: Section 1 describes the institutional background and the data, including a discussion of workplace safety oversight in China and also discussion of the channels through which political ties are thought to inuence safety practices. Section 2 presents the main results and robustness checks, and Section 3 concludes.
1 Data and institutional background
Workplace safety oversight in China
Chinese worker safety is overseen by a patchwork of governmental authorities and regulations.
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The earliest signicant nationwide rules governing worker safety focused on mining, with the enactment of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safety in Mines by the National People's Congress in 1993. As with much legislation in China, the Mining Safety Law explicitly recognized that worker welfare had to be balanced with the needs of economic development: [The law] is formulated for the purpose of ensuring safety in production in mines, preventing accidents and protecting personal safety of workers and sta at mines and promoting the development of the mining industry. However, the details of how such high-level directives were to be put into practice were left to lower-level administrative bodies.
Subsequent national regulation, enacted in 1996, targeted coal mining in particular and specied conditions for implementation -such as the training of foremen in eective safety practices -which had to be satised for a mine to obtain an operating license. In 2002, nationalwide rules that covered all industries were put into eect. This came with the Law of the People's Republic of China on Work Safety, which codied worker safety as a set of statutory rights. The law was comprised of 97 provisions covering -among other things -safety measurement, supervision and management of production safety, rescue work and investigations following accidents, and also laid out the resultant legal liabilities. This law was supplemented by the Administrative Penalties for the Violation of Production Safety Laws, passed in 2003 and revised in 2007. It specied the administrative punishments for safety violations, including modest nes (up to 100,000 RMB for an individual and 300,000 RMB for a rm; throughout our sample, the renminbi traded in the range of 6.2 to 7.2 RMB to a US dollar), and, more substantively, license suspensions and mine closures.
Since 2001, the enforcement of workplace safety regulation has been overseen by the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS). This was intended to decouple safety oversight from industrial and mining production ministries. Previously, for example, the Ministry of 6 See Homer (2009) for a detailed history of safety regulation in China focused on -but not limited to -the mining industry.
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Coal Industry had the potentially conicting responsibilities of increasing output as well as maintaining safety standards. Since 2005, SAWS has had full ministry status, reporting directly to the State Council, the highest political body in China.
Despite the many regulations on the books and the signicant power vested in SAWS, China's workplace safety record remains poor by international standards due to ineective enforcement. According to SAWS, there were more than 83,000 deaths in workplace accidents in 2009, or roughly one out of every 10,000 workers (China Safe Production Yearbook, 2009). One reason is that, despite the increased ability to set regulations that came with the 2002 Work Safety Law, enforcement is largely left to local safety boards. These may lack independence from local ocials, who are evaluated and rewarded on their ability to attract investment and maintain economic growth. As of mid-2012, 11 provincial authorities, out of a total of 31, still had not adopted this approach to providing incentives to safety regulators.
8 Table 1 lists, for each province, the dates of the passage and implementation of no safety, no promotion policies. In unreported analyses, we implemented a Cox proportional hazard model to predict the passage of these laws. We will exploit this dierence across provinces in ocials' safety incentives to assess whether well-connected rms are less likely to have worker fatalities in locations where local government ocials are evaluated in part based on worker safety. 8 Note that some provinces had enacted earlier policies on production safety. However, no punishments were specied for ocials that failed to meet safety quotas. For example, Qinghai Province passed Rules on monitoring production safety in Qinghai Province on Aug 27, 2005 (eective Nov 1, 2005), but without specifying punishment for failing to meet quotas. We view provinces under such regimes as equivalent to those without safety interventions. 6 We nd that the fraction of provincial GDP from coal mining is a strong positive predictor of no safety, no promotion laws, but after this is accounted for, no other province-level attribute (including construction output, log income per capita, population, or corruption cases per capita) is correlated with the passage of such laws. When we control for provincial coal output in our analysis below, our results are unaected. Thus, while relatively few provinces passed no safety, no promotion laws during our sample frame -and hence our identication is from the cross-section -there are no immediately obvious correlates of the policy's passage that would undermine our identication. For 49 rm-year observations from 13 rms, death information was not found in government websites or company reports. In these cases, we supplement our data using a media search based on the WiseSearch (www.wisers.com) database. WiseSearch, located in Hong Kong, has broad coverage of newspaper reporting in China, including stories from more than 2,000 newspapers, covering over 80 percent of province-level newspapers, city newspapers and all national nancial newspapers. These 49 rm-year observations contribute 4 deaths to our full-sample total of 1000, a reported death rate that is far lower than that of rm-year observations from ocial or company sources.
Finally, we should also note that for accidents that involve three or more worker deathsdened by SAWS as severe -there is a high level of consistency between CSR and corporate reports on the one hand, and those provided by the State Administration of Work Safety, and in no case was a severe accident reported in the media but not in ocial sources.
Our nal dataset is comprised of 933 rm-year observations, with a total of 1000 worker fatalities. Given the sample average of 3442 employees per rm, this represents an annual worker mortality rate that is more than three times the national average of one in ten thousand -a natural result of our focus on high mortality industries. However, the death rate is plausibly far higher in these industries for privately owned companies, which we are unable to include in our sample owing to data availability.
We dene four measures of worker mortality: Deaths cy , total worker fatalities at company c during calendar year y; DeathRate cy = Deaths cy /Employment cy , a measure of deaths scaled by employment; I(Deaths cy > 0), an indicator variable denoting whether there was at least one fatality at rm c in year y; and an indicator for rm-years when at least one severe accident (three or more fatalities) occurs, I(Deaths cy ≥ 3).
In 239 accidents that led to a total of 789 deaths (out of the total of 1000 in our rm-year panel data), we were able to pinpoint the precise date of the accident. The discrepancy owes to the fact that in some cases CSR or other corporate reports provided only annual aggregates or failed to provide exact dates; in a subset of these cases where only aggregate information was provided, we were unable to determine the precise date of an accident through media accounts. We focus on the 239 accidents with precise event dates in our market reaction analysis below.
Our measure of political connections is based on the previous employment history of top executives at each rm. We dene a company to be connected if a senior manager held a highlevel government post prior to joining the rm. Information on top executive teams is provided by companies' annual reports, based on year-end employment. To construct this measure, we collected the resumes of senior managers for our sample of rms from Wind Information, the largest vendor of raw nancial data in China. We focus on the backgrounds of the Chairman, 9 Vice-Chairman, and Vice-CEOs at each company, positions roughly equivalent to C-suite executives at an American rm. These resumes provide employment histories, including past positions in government. We dene a rm-year indicator variable, P oliticallyConnected cy , to be equal to one if a senior executive on December 31 of year y-1 at rm c previously served as mayor or vice-mayor (Tingju Ji in Chinese) in the city where the company is located, or as a provincial or central government ocial of the same or higher rank.
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In practice, over 90 percent of our connected executives came from the municipal bureaucracy, so we lack the statistical power to examine the heterogeneous eects of connections based on the level of government.
We make a couple of observations about the timing of data on connections and accidents. First, we measure connections at the beginning of each calendar year; the possibility of mid-year executive turnover introduces classical measurement error in PoliticallyConnected, making it likely that our results are biased downward. Second, the fact that we use beginningof-year observations on political connections -that necessarily precede accidents -will be particularly important in the specications that include rm xed-eects, since it ensures that a new executive will have been in place for at least a short period of time prior to the occurrence of fatal accidents that we may attribute to his employment at the rm.
During our sample period, the government held signicant ownership stakes in a number of publicly traded rms, including many in our sample. Plausibly, the composition of a company's top executive team is correlated with ownership status, so it is important to control for government holdings. We dene StateOwnership to be the fraction of equity held by government entities of all levels (municipal, state, and central) either directly or through state owned enterprises. These data are taken from CSMAR at GTA, a Shenzhen-based nancial data vendor.
Finally, we collected data to construct control variables, including stock price, return on assets (ROA), total assets, and investment (dened as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets) from CSMAR at GTA. We obtain total employment gures from Resset, a Beijing-based nancial data vendor. For both total assets and employment, we use gures from the beginning of year y, while we employ lagged values for the ow variables ROA and investment.
Finally, we dene Saf etyQuota py to be a province-year variable denoting whether province p had passed a no safety, no promotion law in year y. Since many such laws went into eect mid-year, we dene Saf etyQuota py as the fraction of days during the year of passage when the law was in eect. (For example, in Hainan province the law went into eect on June 2, 2010, the 153rd day of the year; thus for 2010, Saf etyQuota py = (365 − 153) /365.)
11 Lower-level bureaucrats that run smaller sectors or departments within a municipality (Ke Ji in Chinese)
would not necessarily outrank workplace safety authorities. Table 2A presents the summary statistics for the rm-year panel data. We further show these summary statistics for the sample split into politically connected and unconnected rm-year observations in Table 2B . Of particular note, politically connected rms have, on average, 0.52 worker deaths per 1,000 employees each year, whereas the comparable gure for unconnected rms is 0.09 deaths per 1,000 employees. The worker death rate for unconnected rms is just below the national average of 0.093 per 1,000 in 2005, based on statistics from the China Safety Production Yearbook, while that of connected rms is ve times the national average. Politically connected rms are also larger, as measured by employees or assets, which will make it crucial to control carefully for size in the analysis that follows. State ownership is also correlated with political connections -the mean level of state ownership is 61 percent higher for P oliticallyConnected = 1 rms. Finally, connected rms are more protable, as measured by return on assets. This is consistent with the prior literature on the value of political ties; while the raw dierence in means is not statistically signicant, we will examine prot dierences in greater detail below, controlling for basic rm-year characteristics like province and industry.
with the arrival of a politically connected executive, while the death rate declines by 0.64 with a connected executive's departure. We also list the change in log employment, which is 0.17 in each case, suggesting that rms' growth trajectories are uncorrelated with changes in P oliticallyConnected. 12
The relatively rapid and material impact of political connections of top executives on worker fatalities is in line with the literature on the eects of CEOs on rm-level outcomes.
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that individual CEOs bring idiosyncratic nancial and operational styles to how they run a company, a result that has been rearmed in subsequent work. Indeed, Morten Bennedsen, Pérez-González, Nielsen and Wolfenzon (2007) nd large performance changes in a dierence-in-dierences analysis of CEO transitions, consistent with the view that the impact of leadership changes may be felt very quickly. The context we consider here oers a plausible channel for rapid change -given the rampant corruption in safety oversight, a political connection could result in a discrete shift in a rm's ability to skirt regulation.
We now examine the relationship between P oliticallyConnected and worker fatalities in a regression framework. Our baseline specication is as follows:
We include xed eects for year, industry, and province in most specications, and will further augment these controls with rm xed-eects in some cases. In most of our specications, we will assume a normally distributed disturbance term, and will use a monotonic transformation of Deaths as the dependent variable.
Before turning to standard OLS specications, we rst show our main results in Table 4 using a count model for Deaths, assuming a negative binomial distribution (a Poisson distribution is a poor t for the death distribution in the data). In all specications in all tables, we cluster standard errors by company, except as noted below when we exploit province-level variation in studying the eects of safety regulations. We begin with a specication with no covariates. The coecient on PoliticallyConnected is very large in magnitude -its coefcient of 1.66 implies a death incidence rate for connected companies that is more than 500
percent (e 1.66 ) of the baseline, signicant at the 1 percent level. Adding basic controls for size (both assets and employment) and investment increases the coecient on PoliticallyConnected, which is again signicant at the 1 percent level. When we include xed eects for year, We next present a set of OLS specications in Table 5 , rst using log(1 + Deaths) as the dependent variable. In column (1) we present results using the full set of controls in Equation In columns (3) and (4), we use I(Deaths cy > 0), an indicator variable denoting at least one fatality at rm c in year y, as the dependent variable. The coecient on PoliticallyConnected is 0.18 in (3), and 0.27 in (4), and it indicates the increased probability of at least one worker death at rms with a connected executive, relative to unconnected rms. For unconnected rms, the fraction of rm-year observations with I(Deaths cy > 0) is 0.13, implying that political ties are associated with a more than doubling of the probability of a worker death.
While we have controlled for rm size in all specications, in columns (5) and (6) we scale worker fatalities by the number of employees at a rm, using DeathRate as the dependent variable. The coecient on DeathRate in (5) is 0.47, signicant at the 1 percent level, implying one additional workplace fatality in a given year for each 2,000 employees at politically connected rms. The coecient increases to 0.64 in column (6), which includes rm xed eects.
As we noted in the prior section, P oliticallyConnected = 1 rms are substantially larger than their unconnected counterparts, raising concerns that the latter group may not serve as appropriate controls. While the rm xed-eects analyses deal with this concern to some degree, we also employ propensity score matching to examine whether our results are robust to this alternative approach of matching on observables. We report these results in the Appendix, using a range of matching methods. In all cases, the point estimates are signicant at the 1 percent level and are generally larger in magnitude than the OLS results.
In our analysis, we have implicitly assumed honest corporate disclosures of worker deaths. ing company involved was not publicly traded, it is not in our dataset. This is a critical distinction, since publicly listed rms are generally held to a higher degree of oversight and disclosure.) We note that concerns of underreporting may bias our results downward since, as the Times article suggests, it is easier for well-connected companies to avoid disclosing work deaths. Alternatively, our results could be biased upward if well-connected companies face greater media scrutiny.
We examine the issue of under-reporting in a couple of ways. First, media reports have suggested that worker deaths may be more easily hidden in mining industries, where production takes places out of view and often in more isolated locales.
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A reporting bias would then be reected in the measured eect of connections on worker deaths in mining versus non-mining industries. In the rst two columns of Table 6 , we include an interaction term P oliticallyConnected × M ining that allows the eect of PoliticallyConnected to dier for mining industries (E01 and E05). The point estimates are negative though insignicant, which suggests that if anything the relationship between political connections and worker deaths is stronger in non-mining industries, perhaps indicating that our main results are biased downward.
A separate approach to assessing potential dierences in disclosure for politically connected rms is to focus on severe (Deaths ≥ 3) accidents that are more dicult -though not impossible -to hide from authorities and hence less subject to underreporting. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 , we present results using an indicator for years when at least one severe accident occurs, I (Deaths ≥ 3), as the dependent variable. Compared to the results for any accident reported in Table 5 , columns (3) and (4), the coecient on PoliticallyConnected is slightly lower for severe accidents, though the standard deviation of I (Deaths ≥ 3) is also far lower than that of I (Deaths > 0).
While not conclusive, our ndings are hard to reconcile with underreporting as the primary explanation for the dierence in death rates at connected versus unconnected rms.
The eect of safety quotas
We now examine whether the relationship between political connections and worker deaths is aected by the existence of no safety, no promotion reforms that limited the promotion opportunities of regulators who failed to meet safety quotas. Plausibly, this made it costlier for regulators to turn a blind eye to unsafe working conditions at a rm, regardless of its political connections.
13 For example, one recent article described cases of miners hiding the bodies of other workers in underground shafts to elude detection. See Coal mine deaths fall but still remain high, China Daily, February 26, 2011 Our analysis is limited by the fact that very few reforms took place during 2008-2011, making it impossible to identify the eect of reform from within-province variation alone. For example, in provinces that implemented reforms during 2009 or 2010, i.e., those that would allow for a clear pre-post analysis, there are only four companies with P oliticallyConnected = 1.
Thus, in the results that follow, the eects of reform are essentially identied from crosssectional dierences at the province level in the presence of safety quotas.
As a preliminary overview of the data, in Table 7 we show worker deaths per rm for company-year observations in provinces that had passed no safety, no promotion reforms versus those that had not. For the purposes of these descriptive statistics, we set In the rst row of Table 7 , we compare log(1 + Deaths) for rms in provinces with safety quotas to those without, as a function of political connectedness. For rms with P oliticallyConnected = 0, we observe no dierence across the two groups of provinces. By contrast, for politically connected rms, log(1+Deaths) is less than half as large for companies located in provinces with safety quota reforms. In the second and third rows, we observe qualitatively similar patterns for both I (Deaths > 0) and also DeathRate. 14 In Table 8 , we present regression analyses on the eects of safety quotas by including the interaction term P oliticallyConnected × Saf etyQuota as a covariate in equation (1) . 15
Since the relevant variation in this analysis is at the province-level, we cluster standard errors by province; in unreported results, we cluster by rm, which produces smaller standard errors. Column (1) includes basic rm-level controls, as well as province, industry, and year xed eects. The coecient on P oliticallyConnected × Saf etyQuota is -0.50, signicant at the 10 percent level. It is almost equal in magnitude to the direct eect of P oliticallyConnected, implying virtually no dierence between politically connected and unconnected rms in Saf etyQuota = 1 provinces. We observe a similar pattern in column (2), which includes rm xed eects.
However, when we include P oliticallyConnected by P rovince xed eects in column (3), the coecient on P oliticallyConnected × Saf etyQuota falls by more than a half, with a large standard error. This underscores the fact that we cannot identify the eect of safety 14 In unreported results, we also nd a similar pattern if we look at residuals from a regression of log(1 + quotas from within-province variation in regulation, since there are insucient data on rms in provinces that implemented safety reforms during 2008-11. This raises concerns of unobserved heterogeneity across provinces, where adopters of safety quotas may dier systematically in their oversight of well-connected companies. As noted in the Data section above, there are no obvious province-level attributes that predict worker deaths that are also correlated with no safety, no promotion policies. Nonetheless, considerable caution is warranted in drawing any conclusions on the ecacy of quotas in reducing the role of inuence-seeking in dangerous industries given the source of identication.
A separate concern is that the reduction in fatalities may reect an increase in underreporting after safety quotas are put in place. This issue certainly applies to the overall dierence in worker death rates, which are about half as large for rms in provinces with safety quotas than those without (0.17 versus 0.08). However, we note that it is not clear why this would disproportionately aect politically connected rms. As a separate check on whether underreporting might account for our ndings on safety quotas, we repeat the preceding analysis using an indicator variable for the occurrence of a severe (Deaths ≥ 3) accident as the dependent variable, which is less prone to misreporting. We obtain very similar results in terms of implied magnitudes and statistical signicance.
Impact of worker death on expected prots
Up to this point, we have focused on the determinants of worker fatalities. We now turn to examine the eects that fatalities have on expected future prots, as captured by stock market reaction to worker deaths, in order to adjudicate among potential mechanisms through which political ties aect worker safety. Ex ante, the eect of political connections is ambiguous. Most obviously, to the extent that connections insulate a rm from regulatory backlash following worker deaths, one would expect the share price of a well-connected rm to fare relatively well after an accident. Similarly, given the high accident rates at connected rms, a fatality represents a lesser surprise to the market, and its eect should thus have been largely incorporated into market prices. However, as we have noted above, prior work has found a positive correlation between political connections and protability (Fan et.al. (2008) and Xu and Zhou (2011)). If a fatal accident forces the departure of well-connected executives, the market may respond more negatively to news of safety lapses at connected rms. The overall eect is thus an empirical question.
We dene the accident date as t = 1 and examine the subsequent change in share price as this information is incorporated by investors. In most cases the formal announcement of worker deaths comes much later than the accident itself, so it is critical in our analyses to allow for a fairly long event window.
Further, for a number of cases, multiple fatal accidents occur within a single month of one another for a single rm. These instances are clustered in the construction industry, which has a very high accident rate: the 37 construction rms in the sample generated 134 of the 239 identiable accidents in the dataset. To prevent double-counting of returns that follow multiple temporally adjacent accidents, we proceed as follows: proceeding forward from each company's rst accident in the sample, we drop accidents that occurred within 30 trading days of the initial accident. We then proceed to the next accident (that has not been dropped)
-by denition more than 30 trading days ollowing the rst -and repeat the process. There are 39 instances of accidents clustered within 30 trading days, 31 in construction, and leads to the deletion of 59 observations (sometimes more than two fatal accidents occurred within 30 trading days). We also dene a variable to account for the full set of fatalities taking place at company c within a month following each initial accident a, M onthlyDeaths ca .
In Figure 2 , we present cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), estimated using a standard Fama-French three-factor model, over event windows of up to 30 trading days following each accident date. We show CARs for the full sample and also for the sample divided based on P oliticallyConnected. For the full sample, there is no eect on the stock price following an accident. The same is true for the subsample of P oliticallyConnected = 0 rms, where the average CARS from [1, 1] to [1, 30] sit virtually on top of the full sample returns, simply because these companies represent 86 percent of the sample. For the subset of 23 observations with P oliticallyConnected = 1, we observe a steady decline in rm value from the date of an accident, which levels o after about 20 trading days. There is good reason to expect this delay in investor response: in a majority of cases (110 of 174), the fatalities were not disclosed by the company at the time the accidents occurred, nor were they reported in the media outlets covered by WiseSearch, so news may have been slow to reach the market.
The regression results in Table 9 echo the patterns observed in Figure 2 -politically connected rms suer relatively large declines in market value following worker deaths, with the decline increasing over the rst 20 trading days following each accident. Over a three day window following an accident, connected rms decline by about 2.4 percent more than unconnected rms do. This dierence widens to over 9 percent after 20 days. Our estimates of the eect of P oliticallyConnected are imprecise over all event windows, with p-values ranging from 0.15 to 0.06, so these results are necessarily interpreted with caution. We note additionally that total deaths in the 30 trading days after the accident is also negatively correlated with returns; however, the coecient on log(M onthlyDeaths ca ) is not signicant at conventional levels over most event windows.
To examine whether the negative eect of worker deaths on connected rms' returns is validated by subsequent prots, we look in Table 10 at ROA as a function of lagged worker deaths and lagged connections: Notably, lagged worker deaths are uncorrelated with prots for the full sample. In column (2) we add the interaction term; its coecient β 3 is negative, signicant at the 5 percent level, and implies that the prot premium from (lagged) connections largely disappears in the year following worker deaths.
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The most straightfoward interpretation for the observed negative returns at connected companies following fatal accidents is a greater chance that a well-connected executive -and the prots his connections generate -will depart. It is very common in China for high-level rings to take place following negative company news of any kind (see Yan (2004) among many other media reports for a reference), potentially resulting in the departure of connected executives implicated in an accident.
We thus examine whether a company's political connections are aected by worker fatalities. For a company that is politically connected in year y − 1, we nd that the likelihood that the company is no longer connected in year y is more than doubled if a fatal accident occurred during y − 1 (54.8 percent versus 23.5 percent). To examine the relationship between worker deaths and the loss of political connections in a regression framework, we use the following specication, which captures the relationship between fatalities in year y-1 and political connections at the beginning of year y:
16 At least some of the increased prots are apparently captured by connected managers. While individuallevel salary information is not disclosed by Chinese rms, we may obtain the total salaries of the three highest-paid employees in each company from GTA. We nd that in the cross-section, companies that attract politically connected managers pay their top executives higher salaries.
17 Bond (2002) shows that for a simple AR(1) model with a small number of time periods, within group estimation of Large N, Small T panel data typically leads to a downward bias, and he suggests the dierenced and system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach. Given that we only have 4 years' data (which is larger than the required mininum of 3), Bond's analysis suggests that our within-group estimation may provide a lower bound estimate. When we include lagged ROA in our regression and follow Roodman's (2008) procedure to perform the dierenced and system GMM estimations, we get qualitatively similar results, though these point estimates are larger than our within-group estimation, as suggested by Bond (2002) . 
We present the results in Table 11 . In our baseline specication, including year, industry, and province xed eects, the coecient on log( 1 + Deaths) is -0.10, signicant at the 1 percent level. To appreciate its magnitude, we note that for the set of rm-year observations with non-zero deaths, the median is 3; the results indicate that a rm with this median number of annual deaths is 13.9 percentage points (-0.10*log (1+3)) less likely to employ a politically connected executive by the beginning of the following year relative to a rm with no deaths, signicant at the 1 percent level. In column (2) we include rm xed eects, which yields similar results.
The specication in Equation (3) eectively treats the loss and gain of connections sym-
metrically. Yet the executive turnover hypothesis relates primarily to the loss of connections -it is unclear why worker fatalities would make it less likely for a former government ocial to join a company the following year (indeed, the opposite is more plausibly the case, if adding political connections is a means of dealing with a potential regulatory response). In columns (3) and (4), we therefore include the interaction term log(1 + Deaths cy−1 ) × P oliticallyConnected cy−1 , which allows for a dierential eect of worker fatalities on gains versus losses of political connections. In column (3), we nd that the direct eect of log(1 + Deaths cy−1 ), which reects the impact of lagged deaths for companies without political ties at the beginning of year y − 1, is still negative, though only a little over half the magnitude of the comparable coecient in column (1) . The coecient on the interaction term is negative and signicant at the 1 percent level. Its magnitude, -0.254, is more than four times that of the direct eect, implying a sharp asymmetry between the impact of worker mortalities on the gain versus loss of connections.
18 The rm xed eects specication in column (4) shows a less stark dierence between gains and losses in connections -the implied eect of worker fatalities on future political connections is still more than twice as large in losses relative to gains, but the dierence is not signicant (p-value for the coecient on the interaction term is 0.22).
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18 This relationship between worker deaths and the loss of connections can at least partially explain the decline in worker deaths following a connected executive's departure, as shown in Table 3 . It cannot, however, explain the (symmetric) increase in worker deaths associated with the addition of a connection, nor can it explain the very large cross-sectional dierences in worker death rates for connected versus unconnected rms.
In closing this section, it is important to note that while the rms of well-connected executives fare poorly after fatal accidents, the same is not necessarily the case for the executives themselves. In the 17 instances in our sample where political connections are lost in the year following a fatal accident, we nd that in 13 cases the connected individuals went on to take other high-level positions at other rms, often at the parent company to the listed rm. In two cases the connected manager retired completely, though in in these cases the executives were already in their late 50s, and in two cases the connected managers went on to work at semi-governmental agencies.
20 The fact that connected executives do well in the managerial labor market after presiding over workplace disasters can help to reconcile the relative lack of concern for safety by connected managers with the fact that it often leads to their dismissal.
Identication concerns
There are two primary challenges to identication. First, prior political experience may be correlated with unobserved dierences in managerial attributes. Second, the selection of connected executives into rms with high probability of worker deaths may result in an upward bias in our results if companies hire former politicians in anticipation of future worker deaths. We argue that, while our ndings cannot completely rule out such alternatives, they are hard to reconcile with our full set of results.
First, connected versus unconnected executives may dier in their competence or interest in dealing with worker safety. It is unlikely that such unobserved dierences are driven by a general lack of managerial acumen among connected managers. If this were the case, we would expect their rms to be poorly run more broadly and hence less protable, whereas we observe higher prots at connected company in the data. Rather, we are concerned spercically with managers' ability to execute worker safety measures, and incentives aecting prot-safety tradeos.
To explore the possible eect of the executives' competence in executing worker safety, we include age and industry experience of executives as additional controls in our regressions.
We argue that age proxies for seniority and experience, while industry background captures anexecutive's familiarity with the industry's safety practices. These additional controls have little eect on our ndings. It is important to note that the existence of such career concerns still lead to connected managers causing higher worker mortality rates, which is broadly consistent with our thesis.
In practice, though, we believe the data are more easily reconciled with political ties making it easier for rms to elude safety regulations, rather than generating direct incentives to reduce safety. A standard career concerns model, as described in Jia and Nie (2012), would lead managers with political aspirations to increase employment or output in the interests of economic growth, rather than boosting prots. In addition to hinging on the assumption that connected executives are more likely to seek politicaloce in the future, this model also predicts that connected managers would run their companies in order to promote growth.
We nd no evidence of this in the data: neither employment nor sales is correlated with connections, after controlling for industry and year eects.
A second class of identication concerns relate to the selection of executives into rms with diering worker safety risk proles.Firms may choose to hire connected executives to manage the fallout if they anticipate workplace deaths in the future, perhaps as a result of new projects or changes in safety policies; this would create an upward bias in our estimate of the eect of connections on worker deaths. However, this selection story would also predict a more muted impact of accidents on share price for connected rms, since this is exactly the scenario for which connected executives have been hired. Contrary to this hypothesis, we nd that companies with connected executives underperform following fatal accidents. Further, if connected managers were hired to deal with problems following worker deaths, we would not expect rms to lose their connections following worker fatalities, as we nd in Section 2.2.
A nal selection concern derives from the possibility that rms dier in their safety compliance costs, and it is precisely those with high expected safety expenses that hire former politicians to avoid such costs. This would bias our results upward only if companies with high safety costs are also those where weak compliance would have a pronounced eect on worker safety. There are two primary reasons we believe that this is unlikely to be a rst-order consideration. First, given the positive relationship between connections and worker deaths survives our xed-eects specications, any correlation between anticipated safety costs and selection of connected executives cannot be the result of time-invariant worker risk. We cannot, on this basis, rule out the possibility that a change in compliance costs in turn induce rms to hire well-connected executives, but it emphasizes the strong assumptions required for While the discussion in this section cannot completely rule out alternative hypotheses or the presence of selection problems, we argue that the evidence is more easily reconciled with the use of political connections to avoid costly safety compliance.
Conclusion
In this paper, we document a robust positive correlation between the political ties of executives and worker fatalities at publicly traded Chinese companies. This pattern holds in the cross section and also for within-rm changes in political connections. We argue that our results are best explained by well-connected companies using their political relationships to circumvent safety oversight and regulation, consistent with anecdotal reports in the Chinese media. Further, we nd that the relationship between connections and worker deaths is attenuated for companies located in provinces where ocials' promotion is contingent on meeting safety quotas, suggesting that stronger safety incentives for regulators could signicantly reduce the potential for politically favored rms to shirk on safety. By documenting the impact of business-politics ties on a high-stakes social outcome -employee deaths -our results provide an important contribution to our understanding of the impact of corruption on social welfare, and may serve as a counterweight to the benign ecient grease view of corruption.
While our work has focused on China, it is possible -at least in theory -to perform a similar exercise in other countries where politically connected rms are prevalent. We may similarly examine the role of connections on other outcomes that are relevant to social welfare, like food safety and counterfeit production. We leave these directions for future work. All variables are at the firm-year level. Deaths is firm-level worker fatalities per year; I(Deaths>0) is an indicator variable denoting at least one fatality in a firm-year observation; DeathRate is equal to 1000*(Deaths/Employment); I(Deaths>=3) is an indicator variable denoting at least three fatalities from one accident in a firm-year observation; PoliticallyConnected is a firm-year indicator variable, to be equal to one if a senior executive at a firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor in the city ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) where the firm is located or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; Investment is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets; StateOwnership is the ratio of state shares to total outstanding shares; SafetyQuota is a province-year variable denoting whether a province had passed a "no safety, no promotion" law in a previous year, while for the passage year, it is defined as the fraction of days the law was in effect. I(Deaths>0) is an indicator variable denoting at least one fatality in a firm-year observation; DeathRate is equal to 1000*(Deaths/Employment). A count model is used to estimate the impact of political connections on workplace mortality. The dependent variable, Deaths, is firm-level worker fatalities; PoliticallyConnected is a firm-year indicator variable, to be equal to one if a senior executive at a firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) in the city where the firm is located or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; StateOwnership is the ratio of state shares to total outstanding shares; Investment is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Both Investment and ROA are lagged one year. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) and (2), the dependent variable is log(1+Deaths), where Deaths is firm-level worker fatalities. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is I(Deaths>0), an indicator variable denoting at least one fatality in a firm-year observation, and in columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is DeathRate, equal to 1000*(Deaths/Employment); PoliticallyConnected is a firm-year indicator variable, equal to one if a senior executive at a firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) in the city where the firm is located or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; State Ownership is the ratio of state shares to total outstanding shares; Investment is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Both Investment and ROA are lagged one year. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) and (2), the dependent variable is log(1+Deaths) where Deaths is firm-level worker fatalities. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is I(Deaths>=3), an indicator variable denoting at least three fatalitiesfrom one accident in a firm-year observation; PoliticallyConnected is a firm-year indicator variable, to be equal to one if a senior executive at a firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) in the city where the firm is located or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; Mining is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in a mining industry (codes B01 and B05); StateOwnership is the ratio of state shares to total outstanding shares; Investment is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Both Investment and ROA are lagged one year. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Deaths is firm-level worker fatalities; I(Deaths>0) is an indicator variable denoting at least one fatality in a firm-year observation; DeathRate is equal to 1000*(Deaths/Employment). PoliticallyConnected is a firm-year indicator variable, equal to one if a senior executive at a firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) in the city where the firm is located or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; SafetyQuota is a province-year variable denoting whether a province had passed a "no safety, no promotion" law in a previous year, while for the passage year, it is defined as the fraction of days the law was in effect. PoliticallyConnected is a firmyear indicator variable, equal to one if a senior executive at a firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) in the city where the firm is located or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; SafetyQuota is a province-year variable denoting whether a province had passed a "no safety, no promotion" law in a previous year, while for the passage year, it is defined as the fraction of days the law was in effect; StateOwnership is the ratio of state shares to total outstanding shares; Investment is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. Both Investment and ROA are lagged one year. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. [1,K] is the cumulative abnormal event return, estimated using a standard Fama-French three-factor model, over the window of [1,K] where the accident day is set as 1; PoliticallyConnected is a firm-year indicator variable, equal to one if a senior executive at the firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) in the city where the firm is located, or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; log(MonthlyDeaths) is the log value of the total deaths that occur within a month of each initial accident; StateOwnership is the ratio of state shares to total outstanding shares. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. PoliticallyConnected is a firm-year indicator variable, equal to one if a senior executive at a firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) in the city where the firm is located or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; Deaths is firm-level worker fatalities per year; StateOwnership is the ratio of state shares to total outstanding shares; Investment is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. All right hand side variables are measured in year y-1 while the dependent variable is measured in year y. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. PoliticallyConnected, is a firm-year indicator variable, equal to one if a senior executive at a firm previously served as mayor or vice-mayor ("Tingju Ji" in Chinese) in the city where the firm is located or as a provincial or central government official of the same or higher rank; Deaths is firm-level worker fatalities per year; StateOwnership is the ratio of state shares to total outstanding shares; Investment is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. All right hand side variables are measured in year y-1 while the dependent variable is measured in year y. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Notes: Each data point represents the post-accident cumulative abnormal returns CARs [1,K] , estimated using a standard Fama-French three-factor model, over the window of [1,K] where the accident date is set as 1. (2002) . ATT stands for "Average Treatment Effect on the Treated." Bootstrap replication number is set at 100 in each case. A logit model is used in the propensity score test, where firms are matched on these dimensions: log(Assets), ROA, log(Employment), Investment and SIC-1 digit industry. The Epanechnikov kernel is used in the kernel matching where the bandwidth is set at 0.04, smaller than the default value of 0.06.
